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ABSTRACT 
This Paper addresses the historical development of the right to 
strike in New Zealand law and proposes a direction in which the right 
might properly develop in the future. The thesis of the paper is that, in 
New Zealand, an effective right to strike needs to safeguard workers' 
right to strike in support of their occupational interests, but not their 
social or economic interests. In practice, this 1ight to strike would extend 
to strikes precipitated by issues arising out of workers' own employment 
and a limited right to strike in sympathy with other workers. Although 
this limitation is a departure from the ILO's position, upon an analysis of 
the right to strike from first principles, it is justified. In a functioning 
democracy, strike action taken on a broader basis is an abuse of the right 
to strike. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography 
and annexures) comprises approximately 13,983 words. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Recognition of the right to strike is part of New Zealand's 
obligations as a member of the International Labour Organisation 
("ILO"), under the ILO's Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work. 1 According to the ILO, this means that workers must be 
free to strike in support of their occupational, social and economic 
interests, and to strike in sympathy with other workers striking in support 
of these interests. New Zealand law currently allows only strikes in 
support of a certain class of workers' occupational interests. 
This paper begins by analysing the right to strike from first 
principles, as it derives from the right to freedom of association. The 
paper explores the right to freedom of association, identifying the purpose 
of the right so as to explain its proper extent. From this exploration, the 
legitimacy of the right to strike is identified and developed. 
However, it is impossible to understand the extent of the modem 
right to strike without understanding the historical position from which 
the right developed over the last 150 years. For this reason, Part ill of 
this paper explores the development of the common law relating to strikes 
in the United Kingdom, from the era of combination and conspiracy 
through to the discovery by the House of Lords of the modem economic 
torts. This background should be borne in mind when considering the 
modem New Zealand position. 
Part IV sets out the structure of the ILO and its specialist bodies in 
the area of freedom of association and explores the ILO's position on the 
right to strike in detail. Both the substance of the ILO's position and the 
rationale behind it are elucidated. Finally, in Part V, this paper argues 
that, notwithstanding that New Zealand does not conform to ILO 
guidelines, New Zealand might still have an effective right to strike. 
1 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (ILO, Geneva, 1998) art 2. 
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This paper presents three themes: first, an explanation of the 
historical development of the right to strike and, in particular, to highlight 
how much the right has developed in the last 150 years; second, an 
encouragement of the realisation that the right to strike still has a long 
way to develop before the proper balance is found; and third, a suggestion 
of a direction in which the law might develop, so as to strike this difficult 
balance. 
II BASIS OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN PRINCIPLE 
The right to strike is not an independent right, the existence of 
which can be justified in and of itself. Rather, the right to strike is 
inextricably linked with an effective right of freedom of association. In 
order to find a principled basis for the right to strike it is necessary to 
identify the principled basis for the right of freedom of association and 
then to analyse whether the right to strike can also be justified on this 
basis. The theoretical concepts discussed in this Part are also relevant in 
considering the proper extent of the right to strike, a question returned to 
later in this paper.2 
A Freedom of Association 
In the abstract, the concept of freedom of association 1s a 
fundamental human right guaranteed by both the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights3 and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 4 In this context, its application is 
undoubted. However, separate from this general understanding, freedom 
of association has a distinct meaning when applied in the specialist field 
of industrial relations. 
2 See Part V, below. 
3 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966) 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm> (last accessed 29 September 2002), art 22. 
4 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (16 December 1966) 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm> (last accessed 29 September 2002), art 8. 
3 
From 1945 until the late 1980s, the application of this specialist 
concept of freedom of association was also undoubted in developed, 
Western countries. However, with the rise of the New Right, which 
espouses individualist ideals inspired by the Chicago School of 
Economics,5 the justification of this specialist application of freedom of 
association has become necessary. 
The defining conflict that has always existed in this area of law is 
between the unitarist and the pluralist perspectives. The pluralist 
perspective is that employment is a relationship between the employer, 
supplying the capital resources, and the workers, supplying the human 
resources. Both parties to the relationship have a legitimate interest in 
seeing that their resources are utilised in a productive way within the 
venture. But because the parties have different underlying goals in 
ente1ing into the venture - the employer to profit, the employee to earn -
these legitimate interests will fundamentally differ.6 
Pluralism recognises that although these interests may, at times, 
differ, this does not undermine the basis of the relationship as a whole. 
Pluralism recognises that it is necessary to a healthy employment 
relationship that workers have sufficient bargaining power to express 
their legitimate interests. On this basis, pluralism recognises the 
necessity of the specialist right of freedom of association. 
By contrast, the traditional unitarist perspective evolved out of the 
relationship envisaged in the Master and Servant Acts 7 whereby a 
domestic servant essentially became subject to the complete control of the 
master. This level of control was largely imported into the contract of 
employment, as it evolved to apply to factory workers, through the 
implied terms of the employment contract. Thus the traditional unitarist 
5 See for example Richard Epstein Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment 
Discrimination Laws (Harvard University Press, Boston, 1992). 
6 Otto Kahn-Freund Labour and the Law (2nd ed, Stevens & Sons, London, 1977) 48-52. 
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perspective focuses upon the right of employers to command their 
workers and to manage their capital as they see fit, while regarding the 
interests of workers as beginning and ending with the provision of labour 
under the contract of service. Phrased in this way, as denying workers' 
legitimate interests in the employment relationship, unitarism fell from 
favour with the rise of labour as a political force. However, with the 
intellectual support of the New Right, a new fo1m of unitarism has 
emerged.8 
New Right unitarism is based upon two pillars - first, principles 
of human resource management and second, the sanctity of the free 
market economy. The first pillar emphasises the convergence of interest 
between the employer and workers in the enterprise as a whole, much as 
in pluralism. However, the point of divergence is that this approach 
views management as satisfactorily representing the interests of both 
employer and employee. Therefore, collective organisation by the 
workers is seen as an unnecessary impediment to the management of the 
business. 
The second pillar emphasises the value of a flexible labour market 
in reducing compliance costs for businesses and therefore facilitating the 
development of an internationally competitive economy. In this context, 
it is claimed that the presence of combinations of workers distorts the 
natural operation of the market, thereby causing inefficiencies and 
reducing competitiveness.
9 International competitiveness in an economic 
model such as this is seen as the final measurement of the desirability of a 
particular system. 
Much as classical unitarism appealed to the preoccupation of 
English law with the protection of property and the right of property 
owners to manage and dispose of it how they wished, New Right 
7 See Part III(A)(5), below. 
8 Robin Mackay (ed) Employment Law Guide (5
th ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 2001) 17 . 
9 This analysis of New Right unitarism is drawn from Mackay, above, 17-18. 
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unitarism appeals to the current preoccupation with the market economy 
and eliminating regulatory barriers to its operation. Particularly in the 
general climate of deregulation prevalent in New Zealand in the late 
1980s and the 1990s, the new unitarist approach appeared to be a 
common sense application of general economic principles to the specific 
case of employment. 
Under both pluralism and New Right unitarism, employers and 
workers are seen as having legitimate interests in the enterprise. 
However, the two philosophies differ fundamentally in their approach to 
the proper representation of these interests. 
In areas where the interests of the two groups converge, there is 
much to be said for adopting a unitary approach and thereby maximising 
economic efficiency and competitiveness. Where there is no genuine 
divergence in interests, the forced differentiation of the interests of the 
employer and of the workers caused by the presence of unions may be 
seen to be artificial and unnecessary. In these situations, where the only 
differences between the approaches are in terms of economic efficiency, 
unita1ism may, in theory, be preferable. However, the number of 
situations in which the interests of employer and workers truly converge, 
is limited. 
Particularly in the United States, efforts have been made to give 
truth to the New Right analysis, primarily by co-opting workers into the 
business.10 This process involves granting employees shares in the 
business so that in a legal sense the enterprise can be characterised as a 
joint venture between employer and workers - or more accurately, 
between shareholders. However, the reality of the situation remains that 
employers and workers retain divergent interests in the venture. 
10 John Cline "The Worker Cooperative: A Vehicle for Economic Development" 
<http://www.geonewsletter.org/c line l.htm> (last accessed 30 September 2002). 
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This is only the beginning of the analysis - it is in the areas in 
which the legitimate interests of the employer and the workers diverge 
that the inherent inequality of the individual worker as against the 
employer is most keenly felt. It is in these situations that employers will 
naturally seek to subordinate workers' interests to their own. Pluralism 
recognises that these situations exist and that it is necessary that workers 
have an organisational framework through which they are able to express 
their interests. Thus, freedom of association is seen as a necessary means 
of ensuring that the interests of the workers, particularly where these 
interests diverge from those of the employer, receive full expression. 
Despite the claims of the New Right that management can 
sufficiently balance the interests of the employer and the workers, in 
practice, such a balance seems unlikely to be achieved. As commentators 
point out, management has historically had more in common with the 
employer than with workers; in many cases, the two are coextensive.
11 
While the ideal may be that management would act as a neutral party 
balancing the interest of the employer in their economic capital with the 
interest of the workers in their ongoing employment, in practice, given 
the historical context, this can rarely be so. Management is seldom 
neutral as between employers and workers and in cases where there is a 
genuine divergence in the legitimate interests of the two groups, this lack 
of neutrality will tend to disserve employees. 
Therefore, once it is accepted that employer and worker will 
always have divergent interests, it becomes clear that pluralism is the 
only acceptable basis for the employment relationship. It is only through 
adopting a pluralist framework that the interests of the individual worker 
will not be outweighed and made insignificant by the weighting given to 
the employer's right to manage their capital. 
11 See Adam Smith An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (W Strahan 
& T Cadell, London, 1776) for an analysis of the disparity in interest from first principles. 
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B Three-Dimensional Freedom of Association? 
The justification of the recognition of the right to freedom of 
association does not automatically justify the recognition of the right to 
strike. In order to do this, it must be established that the right to strike is 
necessary to achieve the goals of freedom of association. The analysis 
carried out by Kahn-Freund justifies the right to strike by stating that: 12 
if the workers could not, in the last resort, collectively refuse to work, 
they could not bargain collectively. The power of management to shut 
down the plant (which is inherent in the right of property) would not 
be matched by a corresponding power on the side of labour. These are 
the ultimate sanctions without which the bargaining power of the two 
sides would lack "credibility." There can be no equilibrium in 
industrial relations without a freedom to strike. 
The purpose of freedom of association is to counterbalance the 
inherent inequality of the individual worker when confronted with the 
employer's capital and right to hire and fire. What is necessary to 
achieve this purpose? Freedom to form collective organisations is a 
necessity but, without more, does not effectively address the power 
imbalance between employer and worker. In order to act as a 
counterbalance to the power of the employer, collective organisations of 
workers must be given some power to act themselves. 
On this basis, to the right to form collective organisations, the 
heart of the right to freedom of association, is added the right to bargain 
collectively. The addition of the 1ight to bargain collectively gives power 
to collective organisations, as it allows them to act at the primary conflict 
point between the interests of employers and the interests of workers -
bargaining for employment agreements. However, the right to bargain 
collectively, although necessary, is not sufficient to guarantee that the 
1ight of the employee to equality is not infringed. There must be a 
12 Otto Kahn-Freund Labour and the Law (2nd ed, Stevens & Sons, London, 1977) 225-6. 
8 
guarantee that the process 1s collective bargaining not collective 
b · 
13 eggmg. 
The power of workers in the bargaining process comes from their 
ability to withdraw their labour from the enterprise. However, when 
exercised on a piecemeal basis by individual workers, the withdrawal of 
labour has little effect upon the employer - the employer's power to 
dismiss the worker is a much greater sanction than the worker's power to 
withdraw labour from the enterprise. This is the root of the inherent 
inequality in bargaining power between the individual worker and the 
employer. In order to act as a counterbalance to the power of the 
employer to hire and fire, the power of workers to withdraw their labour 
must be exercised in an organised and collective manner - only then is 
the sanction of withdrawal of labour truly effective. To be more than an 
empty right, the right to freedom of association requires that workers 
have the right to strike. 
This analysis is the heart of the rationale for the three-dimensional 
concept of freedom of association adopted by the IL0.
14 This rationale 
states that the right to freedom of association is only effective if it is read 
as also including the tight to bargain collectively and the right to strike -
hence giving rise to a three-dimensional concept. If the inherent 
inequality between the employer and the individual worker is to be 
addressed, workers must be free to act collectively. 
III BASIS OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN NEW ZEALAND LAW 
Although the arguments for the right to strike are sound in 
principle, the right has not always received legal recognition. Broadly 
speaking, English law historically regarded collective action of any kind, 
13 David Westfall & Gregor Thusing "Strikes and Lockouts in Germany and Under Federal
 
Legislation in the United States: A Comparative Analysis" (1999) BC lnt'l & Comp L Rev 2
9, 
40-41. 
14 Ruth Ben-Israel International Labour Standards: The Case of Freedom to Strike (Kluwer, 
1988) 65. 
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by workers, as unlawful. This position therefore precluded the legal 
recognition of the right to strike. Similarly, the early New Zealand 
legislation 15 made strike action by registered unions unlawful. It was not 
until the Industrial Relations Act 1973 that the modem structure, 
recognising the right to strike, was put in place. 
In order to understand the significance of the modem position, in 
which the right to strike is recognised in one form or another throughout 
the Western world, it is necessary to explore the historical position in 
some detail. Through the evolution of the right to strike one can see the 
attempts of the English system of labour law to adapt from a feudal 
system of status-based law to a modem industrial system of contract-
based law. In many jurisdictions, including New Zealand, the optimal 
balance between the right of the worker to strike and the right of the 
employer to manage their business is still being sought. 
To that end, this Part of the paper will explain the evolution of 
the right to strike in the United Kingdom, define the common Jaw 
economic torts underlying statutory labour law, and set out the modem 
NZ position. 
A The Historical Position in the United Kingdom 
1 Historical General Statutes 
The first statute regulating labour in the United Kingdom was the 
Statute of Labourers 1349, 
16 passed in the aftermath of the Black Death's 
te1Tible winnowing of the labour force. The Statute endeavoured to 
prevent labourers exploiting their new found bargaining power by fixing 
wages at pre-1348 levels and requiring workers to work for whomever 
15 Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894. 
16 Statute of Labourers (1349) 23 Edw 3. 
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needed their labour. The early attempt at legislative intervention was a 
miserable failure, ill received by landowners and labourers alike.
17 
The first statute potentially directly applicable to striking workers 
was the Statute of Artificers 1563. 18 This Statute enacted an offence that 
would be repeated in the Combination Acts, that of 'leaving work 
unfinished.' This provision was relatively innocuous in the period in 
which it was enacted, however it was a provision that became 
troublesome for workers seeking to strike in later centuries.
19 Up until 
the Industrial Revolution, the employment relationship was governed by 
status and wages were, at least in theory, centrally regulated. Workers 
were employed for the duration of a particular project - in this context, 
'leaving work unfinished' refen-ed to permanent abandonment of the 
project. 
By contrast, following the Industrial Revolution, the employment 
relationship began to be governed by contract. In this environment, 
'leaving work unfinished' was interpreted as including even a temporary 
cessation of work. In much the same way as, in later centuries, strike 
action would be seen as inherently involving a breach of contract,
20 in the 
18th and 19th centuries strike action could be seen as inherently involving 
leaving work unfinished. 
2 The Combination Acts 
The Combination Acts were altogether more invidious than the 
general Statutes as they prohibited contracts, covenants or agreements 
aimed at procuring the raising of wages or the reduction of hours - in 
effect making collective action by workers criminal. As will be seen 
below, penalties for breaches of the Acts were harsh and, in some cases, 
procedural safeguards were few. 
17 John V Orth Combination and Conspiracy: A Legal History of Trade Unionism 1721-1906 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991) 3. 
18 Statute of Artificers (1563) 5 Eliz I, c.4. 
19 Orth, above, 4. 
20 See for example Rookes v Barnard [ 1964] AC 1129 (HL). 
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In response to collective action taken by journeymen tailors m 
Cambridge, the first industry-specific Combination Act was passed m 
1721 to regulate the organisation of the tailoring trade, although only 
within the bounds of the greater London area. 21 The Tailors' 
Combination Act voided all existing covenants, contracts or agreements 
for raising wages or reducing hours and made any future agreements for 
that purpose punishable by two months imprisonment, with or without 
hard labour.22 This punishment also awaited tailors who departed from 
service before the end of their term of employment, left work unfinished, 
or refused work without good cause - all provisions that particularly 
inhibited the right to strike. Prosecution was by summary procedure 
before two justices of the peace, with conviction resting upon a 
confession or the sworn evidence of a sole witness. 
This Act provided a basic template that would evolve and be 
applied to further industries throughout the 18th century. In 1726, in an 
effort to quell strikes and violence by workers in the trade, Parliament 
passed the Weavers' Combination Act.23 In contrast to the 1721 Act, this 
Act applied to weavers throughout the country and extended to 
agreements to regulate trade and prices, not just the wage and hours 
agreements of the earlier Act. In addition, the period of imprisonment to 
which breaching workers were liable was increased from two months to 
three. 
In 1749, the combination laws were generalised somewhat with 
the extension of the provisions of the 1726 Act, at a stroke of the drafter's 
pen, to dyers and hot-pressers, felt-makers and hatters, all persons 
employed in the manufacture of silk, mohair, fur, hemp, flax, linen, 
21 Tailors' Combination Act (1721) 7 Geo 1, c.13. 
22 Tailors' Combination Act (1721) 7 Geo 1, c.13, s 1. 
23 Weavers' Combination Act (1726) 12 Geo 1, c.34. 
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cotton, fustian, iron and leather and all persons employed "in or about any 
of the woollen manufactures."24 
Further specific legislation was employed against the silk-weavers 
m Spitalfields in 1773, prohibiting workmen from combining to raise 
wages, intimidating others to quit work in order to raise wages or 
assembling in groups of ten or more to demand higher wages.25 Breach 
of this prohibition was punishable by a 40s fine or, upon default, three 
months imprisonment with hard labour.26 Similar legislation was enacted 
outlawing hatters' combinations in 1777.27 
The final industry-specific measure was the most extensive - the 
Paper-Makers Combination Act 1796.28 The 1796 Act made being party 
to a contract to raise wages, reduce hours of work, hinder the employment 
of other workmen or 'in any way whatever' affect masters in the conduct 
of their business, punishable by two months imprisonment with hard 
labour upon conviction, by way of summary proceeding, before a single 
justice of the peace.29 The offence also applied to workers who 
endeavoured to prevent other workers from taking work, prevailed upon 
other workers to quit work, attempted to prevent masters from hiring 
other workers, refused to work with other workers, attended or solicited 
attendance at an illegal meeting, gave or collected money for an illegal 
purpose, or who used intimidation in order to induce other workers to quit 
work.30 
Finally, in 1799, after 78 years of piecemeal attempts to regulate 
particular industries, Parliament enacted a general Combination Act that 
applied across the country and across all indust1ies, substantially based 
upon the provisions of the Paper-Makers Act 1796. The Combination 
24 Omnibus Combination Act (1749) 22 Geo 2, c.27, ss 1-5. 
25 Spitalfields Act (1773) 13 Geo 3, c.68, s 3. 
26 Spitalfields Act (1773) 13 Geo 3, c.68, s 3. 
27 Hatters' Combination Act (1777) 17 Geo 3, c.55. 
28 Paper-Makers Combination Act (1796) 36 Geo 3, c.111. 
29 Paper-Makers Combination Act ( 1796) 36 Geo 3, c.111, ss 1-2. 
30 Paper-Makers Combination Act ( 1796) 36 Geo 3, c.111, ss 4-5. 
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Act 179931 was passed in response to ongoing collective action, including 
strike action, by joumeymen-millwrights:32 
... a dangerous combination has for some time existed amongst the 
journeymen millwrights ... for enforcing a general increase of their 
wages, preventing the employment of such journeymen as refuse to 
join their confederacy, and for other illegal purposes ... and that a 
demand of a further advance of wages has recently been made, which 
not being complied with, the men ... have refused to work. 
The 1799 Act made entering into an illegal contract, or combining 
for such a purpose, punishable by two months imprisonment, with hard 
Jabour, or three months imprisonment, without hard labour, upon 
summary conviction by a single justice of the peace. 33 An illegal contract 
was one entered into by workmen: 34 
[1.] for obtaining an advance of wages of them, or any of them, or any 
other journeymen manufacturers or workmen, or other persons in any 
manufacture, trade or business, or 
[2.] for lessening or altering their or any of their usual hours or time of 
working, or 
[3.] for decreasing the quantity of work, or 
[4.] for preventing or hindering any person or persons from employing 
whomsoever he, she, or they shall think proper to employ in his, her, 
or their manufacture, trade, or business, or 
[5.] for controlling or anyway affecting any person or persons carrying 
on any manufacture, trade, or business, in the conduct or management 
thereof. 
In addition, the Act also prohibited, on the same penalties, all the 
other illegal activities referred to in the 1796 Act. Finally, the 1799 Act 
contained a potent strikebreaking provision, allowing a master to use 
31 Combination Act (1799) 39 Geo 3, c.81. 
32 (1798-9) 54 Commons Journal 405-6 as quoted in Orth, above, 43-4. 
33 Combination Act (1799) 39 Geo 3, c.81, ss 2-3. 
34 Combination Act ( 1799) 39 Geo 3, c.8 1, s 1. 
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otherwise illegal Jabour35 when the regular workers "by refusing to 
work... or by misconducting themselves... impede or obstruct the 
ordinary course of. .. business," upon the granting of a licence by a justice 
of the peace. 36 This provision effectively allowed the employer to bring 
in non-unionised Jabour for the duration of any sttike activity - strike 
activity that was, in any event, illegal. 
The 1799 Act was continued with some minor amendments by the 
Combination Act 1800,37 an Act that would remain in force for another 
25 years. The Combination Acts, both specific and general, radically 
curtailed the ability of workers to organise and made any overt form of 
collective organisation or action criminally punishable. The Acts also 
had a significant effect on the popular consciousness, with the word 
"combination" assuming powerful negative connotations - "[w]hen bad 
b · d · ,,38 men com zne, goo must associate. As collective organisation 
strengthened, this residue in the popular consciousness lead to the 
adoption of the new term 'union,' exemplified in the motto: "United to 
protect, not combined to injure."39 
3 Conspiracy 
The crime of conspiracy was the equally invidious common law 
companion to the Combination Acts. Although the offence was 
originally created in a 14th century statute restricting its import to a 
conspiracy to pervert the course of justice,40 the offence was later adopted 
by the common law. As in many cases, the common law judges 
dismissed the original statute as "but in affirmance of the common law ,"41 
allowing the judges to expand the offence as the case required. 
35 That is, workers who had not been through the rigid apprenticeship scheme necessary to enter 
any of the trades. 
36 Combination Act ( 1799) 39 Geo 3, c.81, s 16. 
37 Combination Act (1800) 39 & 40 Geo 3, c.106. 
38 Edmund Burke, Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents ( 1770) quoted in John V 
Orth Co111bi11atio11 and Conspiracy: A Legal History of Trade Unionism 1721-1906 (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1991), 5 (emphasis added). 
39 Attributed to the United Society of Brushmakers - Orth, above, 5. 
40 "Who be Conspirators" (1304) 33 Edw 1, st. 2. 
41 Edward Coke Second Institute (1641) 562 quoted in Orth, above, 26. 
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By the early 18th century, the Courts had expanded the scope of 
conspiracy to include any combination for unlawful purposes but the 
extension that allowed its application to workers was yet to come. In 
1721, in response to the same collective action by Cambridge tailors that 
lead to the first Combination Act,42 this extension came, as the Court 
expanded the definition of conspiracy to include otherwise lawful 
activities: 43 
it is not for the refusing to work, but for conspiring, that they are 
indicted, and a conspiracy of any kind is illegal, although the matter 
about which they conspired might have been lawful for them, or any 
of them, to do, if they had not conspired to do it. 
This synchronicity of approach between the Courts and 
Parliament was common until the mid-19th century as is seen through the 
parallel histories of combination and conspiracy. At the very least 
"[j]udges and parliamentarians acted in concert, exchanging advice and 
encouragement;"44 in some cases , the judges were the parliamentarians!45 
The courts consistently applied the reasoning of this decision with 
Lord Mansfield clarifying that "the offence does not consist in doing the 
acts by which the mischief is effected, for they may be perfectly 
indifferent, but in conspiring with a view to effect the intended mischief 
by any means."46 This meant that it was not the end for which men 
combined, nor the means that they used as a combination, but the simple 
fact of combination that amounted to the offence of conspiracy. As stated 
by Lord Mansfield: "every man may work at what price he pleases, but a 
combination not to work under certain prices is an indictable offence."47 
42 Tailors ' Combination Act (1721) 7 Geo 1, c.13. 
4
:l R v Journeymen-Tay/ors of Cambridge (1721) 88 ER 9 (KB). 
44 Orth, above, 31 . 
45 
In particular, a similarity of membership between the judicial House of Lords and the 
legislative House o f Lords was often apparent. 
46 R v Eccles (1 783) 168 ER 240, 241 (KB). 
47 R v Eccles (1783) 168 ER 240, 241 (KB ). 
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By 1819, the courts were willing to uphold an indictment that 
simply pied that the defendants had conspired to "prevent, hinder, and 
deter their said masters and employers from retaining and taking into 
their employment any person as an apprentice."
48 In the employment 
context, there was no longer any need to plead malice or a specific 
detriment to the employer or to a third party - the fact of interference in 
employment decisions was enough. 
One notable difference between the Combination Acts and 
common law conspiracy lay in the mode of trial, and the available 
penalties. As stated above,49 the Combination Acts operated by way of 
summary procedure with a penalty of, generally, two to three months' 
imprisonment. By contrast, a prosecution for conspiracy required all the 
solemnity of fo1m of the common Jaw, which generally imposed more 
procedural safeguards than a trial by summary procedure. However, the 
prosecution's election of the common law procedure was not a two-edged 
sword for defendants as sentences for conspiracy were more variable, and 
potentially much harsher, than those imposed by the various Acts. 
Sentences for conspiracy in the late 18th and early 19
th centuries varied 
from a suspended jail term,50 to four months imprisonment,
51 to an 
incredible two years' imprisonment.52 
The common law offence of conspiracy, coupled with the various 
Combination Acts, precluded legal recognition of any form of collective 
action for over a century. The enforcement of these invidious devices, 
although difficult to gauge and arguably sporadic,53 particularly targeted 
any attempt by workers to take effective collective action through 
collective bargaining or strike action. Between the actions of the courts 
and the legislature, there was no recognition of the right to strike. 
48 R v Ferguson & Edge (1819) 171 ER 714 (Nisi Prius). 
49 See Part III(A)(2), above. 
50 R v Connell (10 July 1819) The Times (KB). 
51 R v Eccles (1783) 168 ER 240 (KB). 
52 Times' Printers' Case (9 November 1810) The Times (Nisi Prius) . 
53 John V Orth Combination and Conspiracy: A Legal History of Trade Unionism 1721 -1906 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991) 56-9. 
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4 Reform of Combination and Conspiracy 
The passage of a reforming Act m 1824 radically altered the 
landscape of collective labour law in the United K.ingdom.54 This Act 
repealed all the Combination Acts55 and exempted workers from liability 
at common law for conspiracy.56 In a clear statement of the basis of this 
Act in a strongly held policy, all pending penal proceedings under the 
Combination Acts, or for common law conspiracy, were declared null and 
void, notwithstanding that they were lodged while these offences were 
still on the books.57 The only limitations the 1824 Act put on the right of 
workers to act collectively were those necessary to "punish ... 
workmen ... who by threats, intiI1lldation, or acts of violence ... interfere 
with that perfect freedom which ought to be allowed to each party,"58 
such actions being punishable by two months imprisonment with or 
without hard labour.59 "Interfering with perfect freedom" included: 
forcing a worker to leave, or preventing a worker from commencing, 
employment; forcing a worker to leave work incomplete; vandalising 
machinery; punishing a worker for not following union rules; and forcing 
an employer to alter their business practices.60 
The reforming Act passed somewhat stealthily through the House, 
upon a calculated silence by its supporters who were "quite certain that if 
the [B]ills came under discussion in the House they would be lost."61 
Although Marx would later trumpet that the Combination Acts fell 
"before the threatening bearing of the proletariat,"62 these supporters 
54 (1824) 5 Geo 4, c. 95 . 
55 (1824) 5 Geo 4, c. 95, s 1. 
56 (1824) 5 Geo 4, c. 95, s 2. 
57 (1824) 5 Geo 4, c. 95, s 4. 
58 "Resolutions of the Select Committee on Artizans and Machinery" Parliamentary Papers 
(1824), 5, 589-91 quoted in John V Orth Combination and Conspiracy: A Legal History of Trade 
Unionism 1721-1906 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991), 73-5. 
59 (1824) 5 Geo 4, c. 95 , s 5. 
60 Paraphrased from (1824) 5 Geo 4, c. 95 , s 5. 
61 Graham Wallas The Life of Francis Place, 1771-1854 (3'd ed, New York, 1919) 215 quoted in 
Orth, above, 75 . 
62 Karl Marx Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (1887) . 
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were, in truth, proponents of laissez-faire economics who believed that, if 
wrongful, workers' combinations would "cure themselves":
63 
Assuming ... that the mass of workmen occasionally combine together, 
it appears absurd ... to suppose that their combinations should ever 
enable them to obtain from their masters more than a due share of the 
produce of their labour. .. The laws to prevent combinations are either 
unnecessary, or unjust and injurious ... It is impossible that anyone 
who will calmly consider the subject can resist coming to the 
conclusion, that a combination for an improper object, or to raise 
wages above their proper level, must cure itself - that it must 
necessarily bring its own chastisement along with it. 
Unfortunately, the natural equilibrium of the market never had a 
chance to establish itself as the legalisation of collective action by 
workers, combined with an upturn in the business cycle, produced an 
explosion of strike activity.64 Despite calls to workers for restraint by the 
proponents of the reform, the situation soon became grave enough that 
employers were able to persuade Parliament to appoint a second select 
committee to look into the combination and conspiracy laws.65 
This Committee's report resulted in the enactment of the 1825 
statute rescinding the effect of most of the 1824 reform.66 Although the 
repeal of the Combination Acts was confirmed,67 the 1825 Act removed 
workers' general exemption from liability for common law conspiracy. 
In its place, the new Act provided a limited exemption from liability 
when the conspiracy was for the purpose of determining the rate of wages 
the workers would accept or the number of hours they would work.68 The 
1825 Act also extended the prohibition on the use of violence, threats and 
intimidation against workers or employers to also prohibit molestation or 
63 McCulloch Edinburgh Review 39 (1824) 320-3 quoted in John V Orth Combination and 
Conspiracy: A Legal History oJTrade Unionism 1721-1906 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991) 70 
(emphasis in original). 
64 Orth, above, 82. 
65 Orth, above, 82. 
66 (1825) 6 Geo 4, c. 129. 
67 (1825) 6 Geo 4, c. 129, s 2. 
68 (1825) 6 Geo 4, c. 129, s 4. 
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obstruction for the listed purposes, which now included attempts to 
achieve these ends.69 Finally, the Act increased the penalty on conviction 
h h · · 70 to t ree mont s 1mpnsonment. 
Following 1825, collective action, including strike action, was 
legal in the United Kingdom as long as it directly related to the issues of 
wages or hours. 71 However, the absence of any provision limiting the 
employment of replacement workers reduced the effective utilisation of 
the provisions to the skilled labour industries. For unskilled workers, the 
oversupply of such labour meant that replacement labour was freely 
available and strike action was likely to be ineffectual.72 
For those who were able to utilise the exempting provisions, an 
issue arose when considering the extent to which picketing of workplaces 
by striking workers was permissible under the 1825 Act. The initial 
judicial response was that picketing did not amount to a "threat" under 
section three of the Act as long as the attempts at persuasion by picketers 
remained peaceful.73 Attempts to persuade workers that it was not in 
their economic interests to remain at work were acceptable, but threats 
that it was not in their physical interests to remain at work were not. 
However, the Court soon reconsidered the issue on the basis of the 
prohibition on molestation or obstruction.74 In two parallel cases arising 
out of the same incident it was held that first, picketing, but secondly, 
strike action of any s01t, would infringe the prohibition on molestation or 
obstruction of the employer's business under the 1825 Act.75 Further, 
69 (1825) 6 Geo 4, c. 129, s 3. 
70 (1825) 6 Geo 4, c. 129, s 3. 
71 See for example R v Bykerdike (1832) 174 ER 61 (Nisi Prius) - a concerted refusal to work 
with other workers; and R v Hewitt (1851) 5 Cox CC 162 (QB) - a concerted action to enforce a 
union-imposed fine; these cases hold that concerted action not specifically exempted by the 1825 
Act still amounts to conspiracy at common law. 
72 John V Orth Combination and Conspiracy: A Legal Histo,y of Trade Unionism 1721-1906 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991) 91-2. 
73 R v Selsby ( 1847) 5 Cox CC 495 (Nisi Prius) . 
74 (1825) 6 Geo 4, c. 129, s 3. 
75 R v Duffield (1851) 5 Cox CC 404 (Nisi Prius); R v Rowlands (1851) 5 Cox CC 436 (Nisi 
Prius). 
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collective action for this purpose would amount to conspiracy at common 
law. The rationale for this judicial nullification of a large portion of the 
1825 Act was that: 
76 
if a manufacturer has got a manufactory, and his capital embarked in it 
for the purpose of producing articles in that manufactory, if persons 
conspire together to take away all his workmen, that would necessarily 
be an obstruction to him, that would necessarily be a molesting of him 
in his manufactory. 
In response to this example of judicial innovation, after much 
debate, Parliament passed the Molestation of Workmen Act 1859.
77 This 
Act effectively reversed the position set out in the 1851 decisions, stating 
that no worker would be liable for molestation or obstruction merely for 
taking st1ike action related to wages or hours of work, or for peaceably 
endeavouring to persuade other workmen to strike for that purpose.
78 
However, there was an important limitation on this legislative 
clarification of the right to strike - the Act stated "nothing herein 
contained shall authorise any workman to break or depart from any 
contract or authorise any attempt to induce any workman to break or 
depart from any contract."
79 
This legislative restriction was consistent with the approach taken 
by the Court in Lumley v Gye,
80 recognising the common law tort of 
inducing breach of contract. The result reached by the Court in Homby v 
Close8 1 was less consistent with the overall statutory direction. In this 
case, the Court held that because unions controlled the actions of a body 
of workers, therefore interfering with the perfect freedom of each 
individual worker, unions were inherently acting in restraint of trade.
82 
The practical result of this decision for unions was that they could not 
76 
R v Duffield (1851) 5 Cox CC 404,432 (Nisi Prius) (emphasis added). 
77 Molestation of Workmen Act (1859) 22 Viet, c.34. 
78 Molestation of Workmen Act ( 1859) 22 Viet, c.34. 
79 Molestation of Workmen Act ( 1859) 22 Viet, c.34. 
80 Lumley v Gye (1853) 118 ER 749 (QB). 
81 Homby v Close (1867) 10 Cox CC 393 (QB). 
82 Homby v Close (1867) 10 Cox CC 393, 398 (QB). 
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register under the Friendly Societies Act 185583 and therefore could not 
bring proceedings to recover monies embezzled by dishonest members. 
The practical result for individual members was that they could be held 
liable for conspiracy at common law, on the basis of the restraint of trade. 
Despite some areas of agreement, this initial period of legislative 
liberalisation was the beginning of the end of the close co-operation 
between Parliament and the Courts over the limitation of collective action 
by workers. With labour becoming a stronger political force, the days 
when legislators could afford to subordinate its interests to those of 
factory owners were fast passing. However, the hostility of the general 
Courts towards organised labour and, in particular, collective strike 
action, continued throughout the 20th century. The judicial attitude 
toward unions is most memorably summed up in the dictum of Lord 
Diplock that applying permissive statutes "tended to stick in the judicial 
gorge."84 
In addition, by the middle of the 19th century, the role of contract 
in the employment relationship was well established. Parliament and the 
Courts were beginning to protect the sanctity of the contractual 
relationship - a trend that, particularly in the Courts, would also continue 
throughout the 20th century. 
5 Master and Servant 
Before going on to address the development of the modem 
economic to1ts, it is necessary to address one area that has thus far been 
neglected - the law of master and servant that underlay the employment 
relationship through until the late 19th century. 
The law of master and servant can be traced back to the provisions 
of the Statute of Artificers . 85 As labour became more organised and 
83 Fri endl y Societi es Act ( 1855) 18 & 19 Viet, c.63. 
84 Express Newspapers Ltd v MacShane [ 1980) l All ER 65. 
85 Statute of Artificers ( 1563) 5 Eliz 1, c.4. 
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began to attempt strike action m the 17
th and early 1gth centuries, the 
prohibition on leaving work unfinished contained in the Statute became 
of particular relevance. While the provision was conceived of in an era 
when a workman was employed to complete a particular project, and was 
intended to address permanent abandonment of that project, its terms 
were equally applicable to any temporary cessation of work. The 
provisions could therefore be utilised against workers, substantially on 
the basis of the master's word that the work remained unfinished.
86 
The law was updated in 1823,87 but, rather than liberalising the 
law in a manner consistent with the 1824 and 1825 Acts repealing the 
Combination Acts,88 the 1823 Act simply restated the position under the 
Statute of Artificers. The only modifications were where it was felt 
appropriate to introduce a reference to contract and to extend the penalty 
for leaving work unfinished to three months imprisonment with or 
without hard labour. 89 
The law of master and servant was again restated in 1867, but 
other than a simplification of the language used, the substantive law 
remained the same, allowing complaint by the employer to the Court:
90 
wherever the . . . employed shall neglect or refuse to fulfil any contract 
of service, or the employed shall neglect or refuse to commence his 
service according to the contract, or shall absent himself from his 
service, or wherever any question, difference or dispute shall arise as 
to the rights or liabilities of either of the parties, or touching any 
misusage, misdemeanour, misconduct, ill-treatment, or injury to the 
person or property ... 
As the 19th century progressed, the restrictive provisions of the 
law of master and servant were seen as increasingly anachronistic and 
86 
John V Orth Combination and Conspiracy: A Legal History of Trade Unionism 1721-1906 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991) l 08-9. 
87 Master and Servant Act (1823) 4 Geo 4, c.34. 
88 (1824) 5 Geo 4, c. 95; (1825) 6 Geo 4, c. 129. 
89 Master and Servant Act (1823) 4 Geo 4, c.34, s 3. 
90 Master and Servant Act (1867) 30 & 31 Viet, c.141, s 4. 
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outdated. In particular, with the passage of the 1824 & 1825 Acts, and 
the clarifying Molestation of Workmen Act 1859, the broad sanctions 
available to employers for any absence from service by employees were 
inconsistent with the specific statutory scheme relating to collective 
action by workers. 
6 Legislative reform and the development of the modem common law 
Partially in response to the incoherence of the laws of collective 
action and of master and servant, and partially in response to the 
increasing political power of trade unions, an attempt at legislative 
clarification was made in 1871. This attempt consisted of two Acts, the 
1 I f d · 91 first addressing the ega status o tra e umons, and the second 
addressing the law of strikes.92 
The Trade Union Act 1871 clarified that: 93 
the purposes of any trade union shall not, by reason merely that they 
are in restraint of trade, be deemed to be unlawful so as to render any 
member of such trade union liable to criminal prosecution for 
conspiracy or otherwise. 
The Trade Union Act 1871 also provided for registration of trade 
unions in recognition of their new found legal status, however most 
contracts entered into by a union were still not enforceable by the union.94 
The Criminal Law Amendment Act 1871 repealed the 1825 Act 
and the Molestation of Workmen Act 1859 and codified the law of 
strikes . It provided that strikes were legal (under the Act) unless they 
combined an illegal action with an illegal intent. The illegal actions were 
familiarly defined as violence, threats, intimidation, molestation and 
obstruction. 
9 1 Trade Union Act (187 1) 34 & 35 Viet, c.3 1. 
92 Criminal Law Amendment Act (187 1) 34 & 35 Viet, c. 32. 
93 Trade Union Act (1871 ) 34 & 35 Viet, c.3 1, s 2. 
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The illegal intent necessary to complete the offence was an intent 
to coerce a master: to dismiss a workman; not to offer a workman 
employment; to belong, or not to belong, to any association or 
combination; to pay any fine imposed by such an association or 
combination; or to alter their mode of carrying on business.
95 An intent 
to coerce a workman to quit employment or to return work incomplete, 
not to accept employment, to belong, or not to belong, to any association 
or combination, or to pay any fine imposed by such an association or 
combination was also illegal.96 
However, despite the best intentions of the legislature, this 
particular attempt at reform was ineffective. In a case shortly after the 
enactment of the Trade Union Act 1871, workmen were found guilty of 
criminal conspiracy for acting collectively, not because collective action 
was a conspiracy in restraint of trade, but because it was a conspiracy to 
interfere with the employer's free will.97 This obstructive decision is 
symptomatic of the growing conflict between Parliament and the Courts 
over industrial relations policy in the late 19
th century. 
Parliament more successfully reformed the law of collective 
action with the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875.
98 This 
Act repealed the remnants of the Statute of Artificers,
99 the Master and 
Servant Act 1867, 100 the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1871, 
101 and any 
other provision making breach of contract a criminal offence.
102 The 
1875 Act made breach of contract a purely civil action, unless it led to 
injury to persons or property, or the inten-uption of gas or water 
94 Trade Union Act (1871) 34 & 35 Viet, c.31, s 4. 
95 Criminal Law Amendment Act (187 1) 34 & 35 Viet, c.32, s l. 
96 Criminal Law Amendment Act (187 1) 34 & 35 Viet, c.32, s l. 
97 R v Bunn (1872) 12 Cox CC 316. 
98 Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act (1875) 38 & 39 Viet, c.86. 
99 Statute of Artificers (1563) 5 Eliz 1, c.4. 
100 Master and Servant Act (1867) 30 & 31 Viet, c.141. 
101 Criminal Law Amendment Act (1871) 34 & 35 Viet, c.32. 
102 Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act (1875) 38 & 39 Viet, c.86, s 17. 
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1. 103 supp 1es. In addition the act definitively ousted the formulation of 
. l . d d . h C b . d T l l 04 . h l OS conspiracy a1 own m t e am n ge ay ors case, statmg t at: 
an agreement or combination by two or more persons to do or to 
procure to be done any act in contemplation or furtherance of a trade 
dispute between employers and workmen shall not be indictable as a 
conspiracy if such act committed by one person would not be 
punishable as a crime. 
The 1875 Act retained the structural definition of a strike as 
lawful unless combining an illegal action with an illegal intention, 
however both limbs of the definition were reformulated. An illegal action 
took place when a person: 106 
[l.l uses violence to or intimidates [an]other person or his wife and 
children, or injures his property; or, 
[2.J persistently follows [an]other person about from place to place; 
or, 
[3.J hides any tools, clothes, or other property owned or used by 
[an]other person, or deprives him of or hinders him in the use thereof; 
or, 
[4.] watches or besets the house or other place where [an]other person 
resides, or works, or carries on business, or happens to be, or the 
approach to such house or place; or, 
[5.l follows [an]other person with two or more other persons in a 
disorderly manner through any street or road. 
The 1875 Act defined an illegal intention as simply an intention 
"to compel any other person to abstain from doing or to do any act which 
such other person has a legal 1ight to do or abstain from doing." 107 The 
Act also contained an express exception to this rule, aimed at peaceful 
103 Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act (1875) 38 & 39 Viet, c.86, ss 5 & 30. 
104 R v Joumeymen-Taylors of Cambridge (1721) 88 ER 9 (KB). 
105 Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act (1875) 38 & 39 Viet, c.86, s 3. 
106 Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act (1875) 38 & 39 Viet, c.86, s 7. 
107 Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act ( 1875) 38 & 39 Viet, c.86, s 3. 
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picketing, stating that attending a place "in order merely to obtain or 
communicate information" 108 did not amount to an illegal action. 
Some judicial interpretations of this legislation were consistent 
with the legislature's liberal policy, for example, holding that 
intimidation must involve creation of the fear of bodily injury.
109 
However, in the early 20th century, the House of Lords mounted a frontal 
assault on workers' ability to organise collectively, discovering the 
common law economic torts. These torts essentially amounted to 
translations of aspects of the crime of conspiracy, now excluded by 
statute, into the realm of civil law. 
First, the House of Lords created the tort of conspiracy that, 
similarly to the crime of conspiracy, is committed when two or more 
persons combine to injure another's trade or business, and some injury 
results. 110 The conspirators commit the tort notwithstanding that their 
conduct may have been perfectly legal had they not combined to do it. 
Secondly, the House of Lords affirmed the existence of the tort 
f . . d . L [ G I 1 1 . d b h f I I 
2 
1rst recognise m um ey v ye - m ucement to reac o contract. 
This tort imposes liability when the tortfeasor, with knowledge of a 
contract between two parties, persuades or induces one of the parties to 
the contract to breach it to the detriment of the third party. This tort may 
take the form of direct inducement, where the tortfeasor has direct contact 
with one of the parties to the contract, or indirect procurement, where the 
tortfeasor encourages another party to perfo1m an action causing a party 
to the contract to breach their obligations. In the case of direct 
inducement, the legality of the inducing action is immaterial, however, in 
the case of indirect procurement, the procuring action must be unlawful in 
itself. 
108 Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act (1875) 38 & 39 Viet, c.86, s 7. 
109 Gibson v Lawson [1891] 2 QB 559 . 
11 0 Quinn v Leathem [1901] AC 495 (HL) . 
111 Lumley v Gye (1853) 118 ER 749 (QB) . 
11 2 South Wales Miners ' Federation v Glamorgan Coal Co [1905) AC 239 (HL) . 
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The House of Lords also suggested, without immediate 
confirmation, that a tort of intimidation might also exist, separate from 
the tort of inducement to breach of contract. 113 This suggestion lay 
dormant until 1964 when the tort was fully recognised. 114 Intimidation 
occurs when a person threatens another with an illegal action and that 
person changes their actions as a result of the threat to their detriment or 
the detriment of a third party. When the damage occurs to the party 
threatened it is known as two-party intimidation; when the damage occurs 
to a third party it is known as three-party intimidation. 
However, perhaps the most telling of the House of Lords' 
extensions of the common law was its decision that unions could be 
directly liable for the commission of these torts by their members. 115 As 
a result of this decision, combined with the other extensions of the law of 
tort, the UK Parliament enacted the Trade Disputes Act 1906, stating that 
no tort liability would lie for any peaceful action taken in furtherance of a 
trade dispute. 
B The New Zealand Position 
1 1894-1973 
Prior to the enactment of any specific legislation in New Zealand, 
the common law position applied, modified by the adoption of various 
statutes from the United Kingdom. However, while indust1ial turbulence 
and disharmony between Parliament and the House of Lords on industrial 
relations issues became more pronounced in the United Kingdom in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries , the New Zealand Parliament intervened 
decisively before this unrest became rooted in New Zealand. 
11 3 Allen v Flood [18981 AC l , 97-8. 
11 4 Rookes v Barnard [ 1964] AC 1129. 
115 Taff Vale Railway Co v Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants [1901] AC 426 (Ill.,). 
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One of the pnmary purposes of the Industrial Conciliation & 
Arbitration Act 1894 ("IC & A Act") was "to put an end to the larger and 
more dangerous class of strikes and lockouts" 116 and, to this end, the Act 
made strike action illegal for registered unions. In return, the I C & A 
Act granted registered unions monopoly bargaining rights within the 
relevant geographical area and industry and, latterly, enforced 
compulsory union membership. 117 The lynchpin of the I C & A system 
was the system of national awards, granted by the Arbitration Court, 
covering all workers in a particular industry. As long as this award 
system retained the widespread support of workers and employers, the 
goal of the system to keep industrial conflict to a minimum was, by and 
large, achieved. 118 
However, as the New Zealand economy received several serious 
blows in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it was clear that the era of central 
regulation through the I C & A system was over. 119 The Industrial 
Relations Act 1973 began a new era in New Zealand labour law with the 
recognition of a statutory right to strike. Under this statute, the right was 
related to the rights-interest distinction - broadly, a strike was lawful if it 
related to a matter of interest such as bargaining for a collective contract 
but unlawful if it related to an issue of rights that could be determined by 
a court. Following some politically embarrassing aborted prosecutions, 
the Industrial Relations Amendment Act 1978 made breach of the strike 
provisions a civil rather than a criminal matter. 
2 1973-2000 
The most significant change in this pe1iod, with respect to the 
right to strike, was the change in language implemented in 1987. The 
Labour Relations Act 1987 changed the language of the basic distinction 
116 Reeves State Experiments in Australia and New Zealand quoted in Robyn Mackay (ed) 
Employ111e11t Law Guide (5 th ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 2001) 340-1. 
11 7 Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Amendment Act 1936. 
118 
James Holt Compulsory Arbitration in New Zealand: the first 40 years (Auckland University 
Press , Auckland, 1986). 
119 
Anderson and others (ed) Mazengarb 's Employment Law (LexisNexis Butterworths, 
Auckland, 2002) para lntro.7. 
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created in the Industrial Relations Act 1973 from rights-interests to 
lawful-unlawful. This change was a clear statement that the primary 
decision about the lawfulness of strike action would be made by the 
legislature, not the Courts. 
Under the Labour Relations Act a strike was lawful if, similarly to 
under the Industrial Relations Act, it related to the negotiation of an 
award or agreement. 120 A significant point to note, in comparing this 
provision with later legi~lation, is that this provision did not explicitly 
exclude sympathy strikes. 121 Another point of interest is that, at this 
stage, bargaining was still conducted at an industry level. This meant 
that, although, in theory, the right to strike was limited to the group in 
negotiation, in practice, this was a very broad group indeed. 
The law of strikes was radically altered by the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991. The 1991 Act abolished the remnants of the IC & A 
system, including industry-level bargaining, and moved to a strongly 
individualistic system of employment Jaw. Employment contracts were a 
matter for the employer and the employee, with unions playing no 
acknowledged role, and collective contracts amounted to aggregations of 
individual contracts, rather than truly collective documents. In this 
environment, even with little change to the wording of the provisions 
relating to strike action, the right to strike would have been considerably 
restricted. However, the 1991 Act also explicitly limited lawful strike 
action to those workers who would be covered by the collective 
1 . · 122 emp oyment contract m quest10n. 
Although the Employment Contracts Act maintained the lawful-
unlawful distinction, because of the restrictive way in which bargaining 
was defined, the matters in respect of which lawful strike action could be 
120 Labour Relations Act 1987, s 233(a); Victoria University of Wellington Industrial Relations 
Centre The New Zealand System of Industrial Relations (Industrial Relations Centre - Victoria 
University of Wellington, 1989) 73-4. 
121 Compare Labour Relations Act 1987, s 233(c)(ii) excluding sympathy action where the strike 
relates to negotiations for a redundancy agreement. 
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taken were similarly restricted. While under the Labour Relations Act 
bargaining had taken place at an industry level, therefore justifying 
industry-level and sympathy strikes, under the Employment Contracts 
Act, bargaining was statutorily limited to single-employer negotiations 
and often occurred on an individual employer-employee basis. This 
limited lawful strike action to employees on the same contract in the same 
enterprise, effectively making sympathy and industry-wide/multi-
employer strikes unlawful. 
A practical difficulty with this approach, which the drafters may 
or may not have foreseen, is that the focus of the Employment Contracts 
Act on the individualisation of employment contracts resulted in 
employers largely dictating the content of contracts. Thus, employers 
were free to manipulate the "strike potential" of their workforce by 
placing different groups of workers on different contracts, with different 
expiry dates, effectively ruling out the possibility of workers taking 
effective strike action. 
3 Employment Relations Act 2000 
The Employment Relations Act 2000 received much publicity 
during its passage through the House of Representatives, being alternately 
lavished with praise or lambasted, depending on the side of the House to 
which the Member belonged. In short, the 2000 Act maintains the basic 
structures of the 1991 Act while introducing a number of new provisions 
with respect to collective action. The three most significant changes are: 
the introduction of a general requirement of "good faith" binding all 
parties to the employment relationship; 
123 the legalisation of multi-
employer collective agreements and the restoration of the position of the 
union in collective bargaining; 
124 and the introduction of a prohibition on 
the use of replacement labour outside essential industries.
125 
122 Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 64. 
123 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 4. 
124 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 40. 
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In relation to strikes, the Employment Relations Act maintains the 
lawful-unlawful distinction of the previous statutes. 126 In addition, the 
strike must still relate to a bargaining issue in order to be lawful (subject 
to a narrow health and safety exception.) However, because of the 
expanded potential coverage of an employment agreement, the practical 
effect of the 2000 Act has been a liberalisation of the law of strikes. 
In order to be lawful a strike must relate to bargaining "for a 
collective agreement that will bind each of the employees concerned" and 
not be unlawful under section 86. 127 A strike will be unlawful under 
section 86 if it: 128 
(a) occurs while a collective agreement binding the employees 
participating in the strike ... is in force; or 
(b) occurs during bargaining for a proposed collective agreement that 
will bind the employees participating in the strike . . . , unless -
(i) at least 40 days have passed since the bargaining was 
initiated; and 
(ii) if on the date bargaining was initiated the employees 
were bound by the same collective agreement, that 
collective agreement has expired; and 
(iii) if on that date the employees were bound by different 
collective agreements, at least one of those collective 
agreements has expired; or 
(c) relates to a personal grievance; or 
(d) relates to a dispute; or 
(e) relates to any matter dealt with in Part 3 [Freedom of 
Association]; or 
(f) is in an essential service and the requirements as to notice ... have 
not been complied with; or 
(g) takes place in contravention of an order of the Court. 
125 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 97. 
126 See Labour Relations Act 1987, Employment Contracts Act 1991. 
127 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 83 . 
128 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 86(1) . 
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In addition, a strike may be lawful if employees have reasonable 
grounds for believing it necessary on the grounds of safety or health.
129 If 
a strike is lawful under the ERA, no proceedings in tort, or for an 
injunction, or for a penalty or a compliance order under the ERA itself, 
can be brought. 130 In addition, the employer is prohibited from utilising 
replacement labour outside essential industries.
131 
The effect of these provisions is that only primary strike action 
132 
related to bargaining for a new employment agreement, or to safety and 
health issues, is protected, subject to further restrictions in essential 
industries. However, where strike action is lawful, its effectiveness is 
safeguarded by the prohibition on replacement labour and statutory 
protection from Court proceedings. 
IV BASIS OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The right to strike is expressly recognised in the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
133 where it is stated 
that signatory States undertake to ensure "the right to strike, provided that 
it is exercised in conformity with the laws of the particular country."
134 
This Part of the paper traces the development of the right to strike 
m international law through the jurisprudence of the ILO. The ILO 
regards the right to strike as being of fundamental importance, being one 
of the limbs of the three-dimensional concept of freedom of association. 
First, the institutional structure and the mandate of the ILO and its 
various Committees are explained. Secondly, the ILO's view on the 
129 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 84. 
130 
Employment Relations Act 2000, s85(l)(a)-(c). 
131 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 97. 
132 Primary strike action refers to strike action taken by the workers for whose direct benefit the 
strike action is taken; secondary strike action refers to strike action taken by other workers, who 
will receive no direct benefit, in support of the primary strike action. 
133 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ( 16 December 1966) 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm> (last accessed 29 September 2002). 
134 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, above, art 8(l)(d). 
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proper ambit of freedom of association and the right to strike are set out 
and finally, some criticisms of the II.D's approach are put forward. 
A The International Labour Organisation 
1 General 
The ILO 1s the pnmary international organisation having 
jurisdiction over employment law, including issues such as the right to 
st1ike. The ILO is a tripartite organisation in which representatives of the 
Government, workers and employers of each Member State are given a 
separate voice. This tripartite structure is unique amongst international 
organisations in its inclusion of non-governmental organisations and 
reflects the pluralist base upon which the ILO' s jurisprudence is built. 
New Zealand is a foundation member of the ILO and, as at 29 September 
2002, 176 countries are members worldwide. 135 
One of pnmary purposes of the ILO, as enshrined in its 
Constitution, is to promote lasting peace through social justice. 136 This is 
to be achieved through the promulgation of minimum labour standards 
designed to improve the conditions of Jabour internationally by 
eliminating injustice, hardship and privation. 137 
The ILO has pursued this purpose with great vigour - indeed, 
some commentators have suggested that it has been guilty of an 
overproduction of these labour standards. 138 In addition, many of the 
standards are "very detailed and perhaps stress prescription and detail at 
the expense of underlying objectives and flexibility of application" 139 
such that "ratification becomes extremely difficult even when a country 
135 International Labour Organisation - Official Relations Branch Alphabetical List of ILO 
Member Countries <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/country.htm> (last 
accessed 29 September 2002). 
136 International Labour Organisation Constitution ( 11 April 1919) Preamble. 
137 International Labour Organisation Constitution (11 April 1919) Preamble, art 10. 
138 See Gordon Anderson "Editorial: the Role of International Labour Standards" [2002) (2) ELB 
21. 
139 Anderson, above, 21. 
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conforms to the core principles underlying the standard."
140 In recent 
years, the ILO has returned to a focus upon these core principles with the 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
141 
encompassing: freedom of association and the effective recognition of the 
right to collective bargaining; the elimination of all forms of forced or 
compulsory labour; the effective abolition of child labour; and the 
elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. 
The key conventions promulgated by the ILO, for the purposes of 
this paper, are Conventions Nos 87 and 98 which, together with the 
injunction to ensure freedom of association contained in the ILO 
Constitution, 142 provide the general principles governing freedom of 
association as seen by the ILO. 
The ILO, as in any large international organisation, has set up 
specialist committees to deal with paiticular issues that may arise. The 
two that are of particular relevance to this paper are the Freedom of 
Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO ("CFA") and 
the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations ("CoE"). 
2 Committee on Freedom of Association 
The CFA is the most significant of the quasi-judicial bodies of the 
ILO, hearing dozens of cases every year. The CFA has jmisdiction to 
investigate complaints of infringement of freedom of association 
submitted by governments or by organisations of workers or employers -
the vast majority of complaints are made by workers' organisations. The 
CFA, mirroring the ILO itself, is a tripartite body composing nine regular 
Members, and nine substitute Members drawn from the Governments ' , 
Employers' and Workers' groups of the Governing Body of the ILO. 
This t1ipartite structure gives the decisions of the CFA broad validity 
140 Anderson, above, 21. 
14 1 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (ILO, Geneva, 1998). 
142 International Labour Organisation Constitution ( 11 April 1919) , Preamble. 
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among the Members of the Governing Body and facilitates their adoption, 
where appropriate, by the Governing Body. 143 
The mechanism of complaint to the CFA evolved in the early 
1950s as the ineffectiveness of the existing complaints mechanism 
became apparent. Initially, when the CFA was established at the 110th 
Session of the Governing Body of the ILO in January 1950, its function 
was intended to be merely preparatory. When a complaint relating to 
freedom of association was received, the CFA would conduct an initial 
investigation to determine if the complaint required the attention of the 
Governing Body. If such consideration were found to be necessary, the 
matter would be referred to the Fact-Finding and Conciliation 
Commission on Freedom of Association (FFCC) for a full investigation. 
However, the way the procedure was drafted, a full investigation by the 
FFCC could only be carried out with the domestic government's consent 
- as demonstrated by the Peruvian Government's refusal of consent in 
response to some of the very first complaints received, governments were 
not often willing to give that consent. 144 
The reason for the initial framing of the procedure in this manner 
was the perceived necessity of obtaining a mandate for the FFCC's 
rulings . Because its jurisdiction was based on the specific consent of the 
patties , its jurisdiction was clearly bounded and no difficult issues of 
mandate arose. However, this legal nicety was soon set aside in the face 
of the overwhelming evidence that such a procedure simply did not work. 
As a result of the failure of the FFCC due to the unwillingness of 
States to give consent, the investigation procedure evolved such that 
" [a]lthough the FFCC remained available, in substance all examinations 
began to be performed by the CFA." 145 For all practical purposes, the 
preliminary examination by the CFA took the place of the formal FFCC 
143 Ruth Ben-Israel International Labour Standards: The Case of Freedom to Strike (Kluwer, 
1988) 51. 
144 Ben-Israel, above, 51. 
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investigation. Over time, this jurisdiction has evolved to the extent that 
the CPA is able to give recommendations to member States on their 
compliance with their obligations to safeguard freedom of association. 
The CPA takes a broad view of this jurisdiction, both in terms of 
the definition of freedom of association and the group of member 
countries who are bound by its principles. In respect to the breadth of the 
group bound by its jurisdiction the CPA has stated that: 
146 
the function of the ILO in regard to trade union rights is to contribute 
to the effectiveness of the general principle of freedom of association 
as one of the primary safeguards of peace and social justice; if the 
Organisation is to fulfil its responsibility in the matter it must.. . not 
hesitate to discuss in an international forum cases which are of such a 
character as to effect substantially the attainment of the purposes of 
the ILO as set out in the Constitution ... and the various Conventions 
concerning freedom of association. 
The CPA does not see its jurisdiction as limited to matters arising 
out of Conventions 87 and 98 and thus its recommendations are not 
limited to count1ies that have ratified these Conventions. Rather, the 
CPA sees its mandate as coming directly from the ILO Constitution, 
147 
bolstered in recent years by the Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work, and therefore binding on all ILO members. Indeed, 
New Zealand has been the subject of complaint six times , 
148 despite not 
having ratified either of the Conventions. 
145 Ben-Israel, above, 51. 
146 ILO: Committee on Freedom of Association, 1 
st Report, para 32 quoted in Ben-Israel, above, 
54. 
147 In particular Article 10 on Freedom of Association and Article 19(5)(e) requiring ILO 
Members to report periodically to the Governing Body on the position of their law and practice in 
regard to matters dealt with in ungratified Conventions. 
148 See ILO: Committee on Freedom of Association: Report No 324, Case No 2022; Report 
No 292, Case No 1698; Report No 295, Case No 1698; Report No 265, Case No 1385; Report No 
259, Case No 1385 ; Report No 234, Case No 1334 
<http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/newcountryframeE.htm> (last accessed 29 September 2002). 
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Although the point was not without controversy in the early years 
of the CFA, 149 ILO members now publicly accept this wide-ranging 
mandate. In addition the CFA has indicated that Conventions 87 and 98 
provide a useful guide to the principles of freedom of association, 
meaning a State's conduct can be assessed against these Conventions 
even where the State's obligations arise from the Constitution, not the 
Conventions. 150 With the adoption of the Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work, binding on all members, the CFA's 
mandate seems secure. 
The subject matter of the CFA's mandate is equally fraught with 
political difficulties. It is only freedom of association that is explicitly 
recognised in the ILO Constitution and in Conventions Nos 87 and 98. 
The ILO takes the official stance that "since the whole concept of 
freedom of association was guaranteed, there was no specific need to 
secure the right to strike."
151 The reasons for the ILO's attitude are 
unclear, as one would not think the matter so far beyond doubt as to not 
require further elaboration. Internal politicking provides, perhaps, a more 
1 . bi I . is2 p aus1 e exp anat1on: 
... the main opposition to the inclusion of a right to strike within 
Conventions Nos. 87 and 98, came from the Workers' members ... The 
reason behind such an objection rested upon the fears of the Workers' 
group that the safeguarding of the right to strike within the ILO 
Conventions would inevitably require setting its limitations. The 
tripartite structure of the ILO, which makes the adoption of a 
Convention dependent upon the consent of the Employers' group, 
would most likely have led to the safeguarding of a restricted right to 
strike. The Employers' group would have been willing to support the 
right to strike, but only if they could set limits on its use, which would 
have diluted its strength. 
149 See for example the stance taken by the Union of South Africa in ILO: Committee on 
Freedom of Association, 15"' Report, Case No 102 (Union of South Africa) para 128-132. 
150 Union of South Africa in ILO: Committee on Freedom of Association, 15"' Report, Case No 
102 (Union of South Africa) para 130-131. 
151 Ruth Ben-Israel International Labour Standards: The Case of Freedom to Strike (Kluwer, 
1988) 45. 
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This analysis makes it clear that the II.D's official position has 
always been that freedom of association includes the right to strike, in a 
general sense. This is consistent with the position of the CFA that 
regards freedom of association as a three-dimensional concept 
encompassing freedom of association itself, the right to bargain 
collectively and the 1ight to strike. The CFA therefore regards the 
exercise by trade unions of the right to strike as being impliedly 
guaranteed by Article 3 of Convention No 87, 153 which provides that 
"Workers' and employers' organisations shall have the right to draw up 
their constitutions and rules, to elect their representatives in full freedom, 
to organise their administration and activities and to formulate their 
programmes." 154 
However, it is also apparent that the primary reason why the right 
to strike has not been expressly safeguarded is the conflict between 
workers' groups and employers' groups as to the content of the right. 
This conflict is something to be borne in mind when analysing the 
position of the CFA, having a mixed membership of both Workers' and 
Employers' representatives, on the substantive content of the right. 
3 Committee of Experts 
The CoE was established m 1926, and is composed of 20 
independent members, meeting once a year. It is a legal body responsible 
for the examination of the compliance by ILO member States with 
Conventions and Recommendations. This examination takes place on the 
basis of reports sent by governments pursuant to questionnaires prepared 
by the ILO Governing Body. 155 
152 Ben-Israel, above, 46. 
153 Ruth Ben-Israel International Labour Standards: The Case of Freedom to Strike (Kluwer, 
1988) 65. 
154 
ILO Convention No 87 - Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (9 
July 1948) <http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp2.htm> (last accessed 29 September 
2002), art 3(1) . 
155 International Labour Organisation ILOLEX Database on International Labour Standards -
CEA CR Observations <http://ilolex.ilo.ch: 1567 /english/ceacre.htm> (last accessed 29 September 
2002). 
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Upon the completion of its work, the CoE sends two reports to the 
International Labour Conference: the first contains its general report and 
observations concerning certain countries; 156 the second is a general 
survey on a particular subject, covered by one or more of the Conventions 
or Recommendations.157 The CoE's most recent survey on freedom of 
association was published in 1994. In this Survey the CoE confirmed that 
it views the right to strike as being implicitly guaranteed within 
Convention No 87: 158 
148. . .. The promotion and defence of workers' interests presupposes 
means of action by which the latter can bring pressure to bear in order 
to have their demands met. In a traditional economic relationship, one 
of the means of pressure available to workers is to suspend their 
services by temporarily withdrawing their labour. .. thus inflicting a 
cost on the employer in order to gain concessions ... 
149. Under Article 3(1) of Convention No 87, the right to organise 
activities and to formulate programmes is recognised for workers' and 
employers' organisations. In the view of the Committee, strike action 
is part of these activities under the provisions of Article 3; it is a 
collective right exercised, in the case of workers, by a group of 
persons who decide not to work in order to have their demands met. 
The right to strike is therefore considered as an activity of workers' 
organisations within the meaning of Article 3. 
B Freedom of Association and the Right to Strike 
1 Committee on Freedom of Association 
The CFA has always described the right to strike as a 
"fundamental right of workers and of their organisations" 159 and has been 
156 International Labour Office Report of the Committee of Experts Report III(Part 4A). 
157 International Labour Office Report of the Committee of Experts Report III(Part 4B). 
158 International Labour Office Report of the Committee of Experts (ILO, Geneva, 1994) Report 
III(Part 48) Chapter V, para 148-9. 
159 International Labour Office Freedom of Association: Digest of decisions and principles of the 
Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the !LO (4th ed, ILO, Geneva, 1996) 
para 473. 
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zealous in according this right broad protection. The CFA has even 
stated that: 160 
... a 24-hour general strike seeking an increase in the minimum wage, 
respect of collective agreements in force and a change of economic 
policy (to decrease prices and unemployment) is legitimate and within 
the normal field of activity of trade union organisations. 
However, despite wide statements such as this, the Committee has 
also recognised that the right to strike is not of unlimited scope. First, 
"implicit in the right to strike is the obligation to do so peaceably, with no 
attacks on persons or property, without degenerating into riots."
161 
Secondly, and equally importantly, the objective of the strike must be one 
legitimately related to the principles and objectives of freedom of 
association. The CFA has taken a liberal view of what these objectives 
are: 162 
The right to strike should not be limited solely to industrial disputes 
that are likely to be resolved through the signing of a collective 
agreement; workers and their organisations should be able to express 
in a broader context, if necessary, their dissatisfaction as regards 
economic and social matters affecting their members' interests. 
This definition of activities within the legitimate scope of the right 
to strike is further broadened when the ambit of the phrase "affecting 
their members' interests" is clarified: 163 
Organisations responsible for defending workers' socio-economic and 
occupational interests should be able to use strike action to support 
their position in the search for solutions to problems posed by major 
social and economic policy trends which have a direct impact on their 
160 International Labour Office Digest, above, para 494. 
161 See for example ILO: Committee on Freedom of Association, 199
th Report, Case No 943 
(Dominican Republic) para 170; 222nd Report, Case No 1131 (Upper Volta) para 95 quoted in 
Ben-Israel, above, 94. 
162 International Labour Office Digest, above, para 484. 
163 International Labour Office Digest, above, para 480. 
members and on workers in general , in particular as regards 
employment, social protection and standards of living. 
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The CPA regards the legitimate objectives of the right to strike as 
extending to anything relating to the socio-economic or occupational 
interests of workers. While a general right to strike for political purposes 
is not supported, the right to strike is seen to include the right to strike in 
opposition to Government policies affecting the socio-economic or 
occupational interests of workers: 164 
While purely political strikes do not fall within the scope of the principles of 
freedom of association, trade unions should be able to have recourse to protest 
strikes, in particular where aimed at criticising a government's economic and 
social policies. 
Further, it is not just the primary disputants' right to strike that 
should be protected. The CFA believes that "a general prohibition on 
sympathy strikes could lead to abuse and workers should be able to take 
such action provided the initial strike they are supporting is itself 
lawful." 165 More explicitly the CFA has stated that "a ban on sttike 
action not linked to a collective dispute to which the employee or union is 
a party is contrary to the principles of freedom of association." 166 
In any strike, the CFA supports a ban on the use of replacement 
labour outside essential industries as a natural corollary of the protection 
f h . h . k I 67 H h CFA d b h o t e ng t to stn e. owever, t e oes not o ~ect to t e 
exclusion of the right to strike in favour of adjudication by the Courts in 
limited circumstances, stating that "[t]he solution to a legal conflict as a 
result of a difference in interpretation of a legal text should be left to the 
competent courts." 168 
164 International Labour Office Digest , above, para 482. 
165 International Labour Office Digest, above, para 486. 
166 International Labour Office Digest , above, para 489. 
167 International Labour Office Digest, above, para 570. 
168 International Labour Office Digest , above, para 485. 
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2 Committee of Experts 
The CoE has identified the right to strike as one of the "essential 
means" 169 of promoting and protecting workers' interests. The CoE's 
b · · · · h 170 as1c pos1t10n 1s t at: 
. .. the right to strike is an intrinsic corollary of the right to organise 
protected by Convention No 87. That being said, the Committee 
emphasises that the right to strike cannot be considered an absolute 
right: not only may it be subject to a general prohibition in exceptional 
circumstances, but it may be governed by provisions laying down 
conditions for, or restrictions on, the exercise of this fundamental 
right. 
Although the CoE states that the right to strike is not an absolute 
right, the restrictions it envisages are either procedural 
171 or relate to the 
public sector172 or essential industries.
173 The CoE takes a broad view, 
similar to that of the CFA, of the legitimate objectives of the right to 
strike of the general worker: 
174 
The Committee has always considered that strikes that are purely 
political in character do not fall within the scope of freedom of 
association. However, the difficulty arises from the fact that it is often 
impossible to distinguish in practice between the political and 
occupational aspects of a strike, since a policy adopted by a 
government frequently has immediate repercussions for workers or 
169 International Labour Office Report of the Committee of Experts (ILO, Geneva, 1994) Report 
Ill(Part 4B) Chapter V, para 147 . 
170 International Labour Office Report, above, Report III(Part 4B) Chapter V, para 151. 
171 See for example International Labour Office Report, above, Report III(Part 4B) Chapter V, 
para stating that the requirement of a strike ballot will not infringe freedom of association, 
provided the quorum and the majority required are not unreasonable; International Labour Office 
Report, above, Report III(Part 4B) Chapter V, para 171 stating that a requirement that parties 
exhaust mediation and conciliation procedures before taking strike action will not infringe 
freedom of association provided the machinery does not cause undue delay. 
172 See for example International Labour Office Report, above, Report III(Part 4B) Chapter V, 
para 158 stating that the prohibition of the right to strike in the public service will not infringe 
freedom of association where it is limited to public servants exercising authority in the name of 
the State. 
173 See for example International Labour Office Report, above, Report IIl(Part 4B) Chapter V, 
para 159 stating that the limitation of the right to strike in essential industries will not infringe 
freedom of association provided essential services are narrowly defined as those the interruption 
of which would endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population. 
174 International Labour Office Report, above, Report III(Part 4B) Chapter V, para 165. 
employers ... In the view of the Committee, organisations responsible 
for defending workers' socio-economic and occupational interests 
should, in principle, be able to use strike action to support their 
position in the search for solutions to problems posed by major social 
and economic policy trends which have a direct impact on their 
members and on workers in general, in particular as regards 
employment, social protection and the standard of living. 
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In relation to secondary action the CoE takes an identical stance to 
the CFA, stating that "a general prohibition on sympathy strikes could 
lead to abuse and that workers should be able to take such action, 
provided the initial strike they are supporting· is itself lawful." 175 The 
CoE also agrees with the CFA that the use of replacement labour 
"seriously impairs the right to strike and affects the free exercise of trade 
· · h ,,176 umon ng ts. 
C Criticism of the !LO Approach 
In summary, the ILO, through both the CFA and the CoE, 
considers that primary st1ike action is lawful provided it is directed to the 
occupational, social or economic interests of the workers concerned, and 
is not purely political in nature. Secondary strike action is lawful 
provided it is in support of a lawful primary strike. 
On this basis, New Zealand law, in allowing primary strikes only 
for matters directly relating to bargaining or health and safety, and 
outlawing secondary action completely, is not compliant with the ILO's 
position on the right to strike. Indeed, the ILO has stated in the context of 
New Zealand's current prohibition on sympathy and protest strikes 
that: 177 
175 International Labour Office Report, above, Report III(Part 4B) Chapter V, para 168. 
176 International Labour Office Report, above, Report III(Part 4B) Chapter V, para 175. 
177 Director of the ILO International Labour Standards Department, Letter to the NZ Minister of 
Labour (31 January 2001) quoted in Paul Roth "ILO Conventions 87 and 98 and the Employment 
Relations Act" (2001) 26 NZJIR 145. 
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... such action must be otherwise permissible and not subject to 
penalty (provided that in the case of a sympathy strike, the initial 
strike being supported is itself legal) for there to be conformity with 
the principles of freedom of association ... 
However, some commentators have suggested that the ILO 
position is unduly rigid and detailed and that the focus of the inquiry 
should be on whether workers in a State enjoy an effective right to 
strike. 178 Under this analysis, the role of the ILO should not be to provide 
a strict formulation of the content of the right to strike, with no departure 
permitted, but rather to ask whether, in the circumstances as they exist in 
a particular country, workers have an effective right to strike. 
In this author's opinion, this criticism of the ILO is valid. As 
stated above, 179 the detailed approach the ILO currently takes results in 
very few industrialised nations being able to comply with the standards 
laid down in the ILO Conventions. This is not to say that non-
compliance, in and of itself, is a reason to avoid standard setting, or to set 
standards at a lower level. However, in this case, the majority of 
developed nations seem to be in agreement on the general principles - the 
ILO's current approach is causing unnecessary discord. 
In this area, the primary role of the ILO should be to set basic 
standards that those countries supporting the principles underlying the 
right to strike can comply with . The more advanced role of the ILO in 
this area should not be to set ever more complex and detailed standards 
but simply to ensure that every member country is safeguarding an 
effective right to strike. 
178 Gordon Anderson "Editorial: the Role of International Labour Standards" [2002] (2) ELB 21. 
179 See Part IV(A)(l), above. 
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V AN EFFECTIVE RIGHT TO STRIKE? 
Therefore, the relevant question is not whether New Zealand 
complies with the broad definition of the right to strike given by the CFA 
and the CoE, but whether New Zealand safeguards an effective right to 
strike. In order to answer that question this Part discusses, first, the 
nature of an effective right to strike and, secondly, whether New Zealand 
has such a right. 
A What is an Effective Right to Strike? 
The ILO's definition of the legitimate objectives of the right to 
strike is dependent upon two points: first, that a union may legitimately 
pursue both the occupational and the socio-economic interests of its 
members; secondly, that the right to strike may legitimately be exercised 
in respect of both occupational and socio-economic interests. In order to 
address these points it will be necessary to identify the occupational and 
socio-economic interests of workers before returning to the issues 
identified above. 
I Occupational vs socio-economic interests 
The occupational interests of workers and the socio-economic 
interests of workers are, of course, interrelated. The issue of pay, for 
example, is, in a narrow sense, an occupational interest but in a broader 
sense, impacts to a large extent upon the socio-economic interests of the 
worker. Similarly, wide governmental policies affecting the socio-
economic interests of workers may be manifested through a specific 
change in employment conditions, affecting the occupational interests of 
an individual worker. 
However, as a generalisation, occupational interests are confined 
to interests arising around and out of a particular employment 
relationship. The occupational interests begin with the negotiation of an 
employment agreement, including, prima1ily, the terms and conditions of 
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work; these interests also cover the conditions prevalent during the 
working relationship and the circumstances in which the relationship is 
terminated. In short, a worker's occupational interests are those interests 
related to their specific employment, and thus are only held in common 
by a limited group of identified workers. Finally, the occupational 
interests of workers are most likely to be directly affected by the actions 
of their particular employer. 
By contrast, workers' socio-economic interests have a broader 
base. While these interests are related to employment in the sense that 
the fact of employment causes these issues to be of particular interest, 
socio-economic interests do not arise out of a specific employment 
relationship. Rather these interests, as the name suggests, arise out of the 
state of society and the economy in general and are therefore common to 
all workers, or at least all workers of a particular class. These again may 
range from the specific, such as legal regulation, to the general, such as 
the management of the economy. Socio-economic interests, by their 
nature, are most likely to be directly affected by the actions of the 
Government. 
2 Which interests may unions pursue? 
The question as to whether it is legitimate for unions to pursue the 
occupational and socio-economic interests of workers must be answered 
with reference to the principle of freedom of association . This is the 
principle under which unions are formed and therefore any of their 
objects must fall within its broad ambit. 
Freedom of association allows the formation of organisations for 
the promotion of any ideals, provided the ideals themselves are not illegal 
or against public policy. 180 Unions are formed to promote the interests of 
180 New Zealand B ii I of Rights Act 1990, s 17. 
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workers. 181 The pursuit of the occupational and socio-economic interests 
of workers is not illegal, nor, in the modem era, is it contrary to public 
policy. Therefore, the pursuit by unions of these interests is entirely 
legitimate. 
3 To which interests does the right to strike extend? 
The remaining, and more problematic, question is whether it is 
legitimate for unions to resort to strike action in supp01t of the 
occupational and socio-economic interests of workers. As stated 
above, 182 the II.D's position is that anything short of a purely political 
strike is legal - in fact, while workers may not strike for political 
purposes, workers may strike against Government policies, in certain 
circumstances. This seems a very difficult distinction to maintain in 
practice. 
The ILO's position seems to be based upon the rationale that the 
right to strike is a legitimate right of workers and therefore it can be 
exercised in support of any of the legitimate interests of workers. The 
problem with this simplistic analysis is that it does not take into account 
the general rationale for the existence of the right to stiike, and the 
specific rationale for regarding it as an intrinsic corollary to the right of 
freedom of association. In order to justify resort to the right to strike one 
must show that it is necessary to counterbalance the inherent inequality of 
the individual worker when weighed against the power of the 
employer. 183 This is the purpose for which the right to strike is extended; 
to go beyond this purpose is an abuse of the right. 
A strike in suppott of occupational interests falls squarely within 
the purpose of the right to strike. Where the occupational interests of 
workers are infringed it is generally by the actions of their employer -
181 ILO Convention No 87 - Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 
Convention, <http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp2.htm> (last accessed 29 September 
2002), art 10. 
182 See Part IV(C), above. 
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workers must have the power to resist these actions where they disserve 
their legitimate interests. This would encompass a strike taken in support 
of bargaining for a collective agreement, a strike taken on the grounds of 
safety and health and any other strike taken in response to the terms and 
conditions of employment, where the matter is outside the competence of 
the courts. 
By contrast, the right to stiike in support of socio-economic 
interests falls squarely outside this identified purpose. A strike purely on 
socio-economic grounds is most likely to be a protest strike against 
government policy. In a functioning democracy such as New Zealand, 
strike action taken against Government policy is a clear abuse of the right 
to strike. In the case of a protest strike, the strike is taken as a balance to 
the power of government, not to the power of the employer - as with 
every citizen, the worker's remedy is at the ballot box, not on the picket 
line. 
However, this is an example of an area in which the proper limits 
of the right to strike depend upon the social and economic conditions of 
the country concerned. For example, it might be appropriate for workers 
to take strike action against Government policies if normal democratic 
processes had proven to be ineffective. It is in areas such as this that the 
ILO's rigid policy becomes pa11icularly problematic. 
The final area is that of secondary and sympathy strikes, where 
workers strike in support of the primary dispute of other workers. To this 
author's mind, the question must always be whether there is such a 
connection between the two groups of workers that the occupational 
interests of the secondary group are affected. In New Zealand's present 
political climate, strike action must be linked to workers' occupational 
interests before it will fall within the right to strike. As stated above, the 
position may differ in an altered social or political climate. 
183 See Part II(B), above; Otto Kahn-Freund Labour and the Law (2
nd ed, Stevens & Sons, 
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No bright line can be drawn, however strikes in support of 
workers within the same corporate group would usually be permissible. 
Strikes in support of workers in a different industry would usually not be 
permissible. In the case of workers in the same industry it would be a 
matter of fact and degree whether the occupational interests of the 
secondary workers were sufficiently affected in a particular case. If the 
workers were also in the same geographical region then the connection 
between the workers would clearly be stronger. Equally, if the workers 
could show an established correlation between changes in pay-rates in 
their workplace and changes in pay-rates· in another, a sufficient 
connection might be established notwithstanding the absence of any other 
connecting factors. 
This requirement that strike action be linked to the occupational 
interests of workers, in addition to being principled, is also justified on 
the grounds of policy. Allowing workers to exercise their right to strike 
inflicts a significant cost upon the particular employer affected. Where 
the strike action was taken in response to a threat to the occupational 
interests of the workers concerned, most likely traceable to their 
pruticular employer, the cost to the employer can be justified. However, 
where the strike action is taken in response to a threat to the socio-
economic interests of the workers concerned, most likely beyond the 
particular employer's control, it is much more difficult to justify the 
I h · b h" 184 emp oyer avmg to ear t 1s cost. 
4 An alternative approach 
A possible alternative approach would be to extend Kahn-
Freund's formulation of the purpose of the right to strike to encompass 
strikes in pursuit of socio-economic interests. This alternative approach 
would be based on the inequality of the individual worker when measured 
London, 1977) 225-6. 
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against the power of the Government to set social and economic policy. 
The effect that the individual worker's withdrawal of Jabour has on 
society and the economy, and through these, on the Government, is 
negligible when compared with the effect the Government's setting of 
social and economic policy has on the individual worker. For this reason 
it might be stated that it is necessary for workers to be able to strike 
collectively in support of their social and economic interests, so as to· 
counterbalance the power of the Government. 
In this context, a possible solution to the policy problem of 
1mposmg an economic cost on individual employers would be for the 
Government to provide monetary compensation to the employer 
concerned, upon satisfactory proof of actual pecuniary loss, where a 
strike was genuinely in response to a Governmental policy rather than the 
particular employer's actions. Although this would be hard to implement 
in practice, particularly in view of the temptation for employers to 
attempt to shift the costs of strikes in support of occupational interests 
onto the Government, it would, if implemented, allow such strikes to 
proceed. 
However, it seems that, notwithstanding that this policy problem 
might be overcome, extending the right to strike to include the right to 
strike in support of workers' socio-economic interests is not necessary or 
desirable. New Zealand is a functioning democracy in which the right of 
recourse to the ballot box is an effective one. In this situation the 
additional right to take strike action is unnecessary. In addition, 
extending the right to strike would put a greater power in the hands of 
workers to influence the Government's policy directly, than that which 
resides in the hands of non-working electors. For this reason extending 
the right to strike, in addition to being unnecessary, is also undesirable. 
184 
This is a policy concern shared by the New Zealand Government - see NZ Government 
Response to the ILO Report on the ERA quoted in Anderson and others (ed) Mazengarb 's 
E111ploy111e111 Law (LexisNexis Butterworths, Auckland, 2002) para ER86. l 8A. 
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B Does New Zealand Have an Effective Right to Strike? 
An effective 1ight to strike allows workers to strike in support of 
their occupational interests. This means that workers should be free to 
strike both in relation to their own collective agreement and occupational 
safety and health, and in support of such action by other workers whose 
interests are sufficiently directly connected to their own. 
In order to effectively safeguard the right to strike New Zealand 
need not enact the full range of protections advocated by the ILO. 
However, New Zealand should, in addition to the current protections, 
protect a limited class of sympathy and secondary strikes, where the 
occupational interests of the secondary workers are directly affected. 
VI CONCLUSION 
This paper has explored the history of the right of freedom of 
association and the right to strike, with a view to showing both how far 
these rights have developed and how these rights have yet to achieve the 
necessary balance between workers' and employers' interests. 
Upon a return to the first principles underlying freedom of 
association, it is clear that an effective right to strike should allow 
workers to strike in support of their occupational, but not their socio-
economic interests. In a functioning democracy such as New Zealand, to 
allow strikes to be taken on a broader basis would be an abuse of the right 
to st1ike - both unnecessary and undesirable. 
Therefore, protest strikes should properly be unlawful, as should 
the category of sympathy strikes where the striking workers' interests are 
not sufficiently connected to the interests of the workers in the primary 
dispute. Lawful strike action should cover only those strikes relating to 
the st1iking workers' particular employment and a limited class of 
52 
sympathy action where the interests in dispute are sufficiently connected 
to the interests of the secondary workers. 
New Zealand does not yet have an effective right to strike, in the 
absence of a limited right of secondary or sympathy strike action. 
However, NZ may safeguard an effective right to strike without fulfilling 
all the criteria laid down by the ILO. 
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